In the context of these debates, the 1827 battle of Navarino -in which a Franco-Russo-British fleet destroyed the Ottoman Empire's navy and paved the way for Greek independence -has often been seen as an early 'humanitarian intervention' .2 On the other hand, recent studies by Rodogno and John Bew have carefully explored Navarino's motivations, justifications, and implications, showing that they were far from fully humanitarian at first, but that the action was seen differently in later decades.3 International law often figures in these discussions, but we are still missing a detailed analysis of how the diplomats themselves thought about, described, and justified their own actions in legal terms. Drawing on Ottoman and British archival sources, this article undertakes such an examination -but this is not a story of humanitarianism, or of its absence. The article finds that during the 1820s, European4 and Ottoman diplomats' legal debates did not revolve around the two topics most discussed in the existing literature: whether humanitarianism could justify force, or whether the Ottomans' religion diminished their legal protection.
The most hotly contested legal question at the time was, rather, whether the allies and Ottomans were at war -a point not explored in the existing literature.5 War was a legally recognised way to settle disputes, and the states involved had many disputes to settle. What generated specifically legal (as opposed to political) debates at the time was not so much that the allies imposed a naval blockade and then fought the battle of Navarino in 1827, but that they did this while denying that they were at war. The Ottomans challenged
